Washington International Law Journal
Volume 21
Number 3 The Future of Nuclear Power in East
Asia
6-1-2012

Alternative Dispute Resolution Design in Financial Markets—Some
More Equal Than Others: Hong Kong's Proposed Financial Dispute
Resolution Center in the Context of the Experience in the United
Kingdom, United States, Australia, and Singapore
Shahla F. Ali
Antonio Da Roza

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the
Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Shahla F. Ali & Antonio Da Roza, Alternative Dispute Resolution Design in Financial Markets—Some More
Equal Than Others: Hong Kong's Proposed Financial Dispute Resolution Center in the Context of the
Experience in the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, and Singapore, 21 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 485
(2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol21/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESIGN
IN FINANCIAL MARKETS—
SOME MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS:
HONG KONG’S PROPOSED FINANCIAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CENTER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND SINGAPORE
Shahla F. Ali† & Antonio Da Roza††
Abstract: Systems of financial dispute resolution currently operate in most major
financial centers throughout the world. As such systems expand and develop to address a
growing number of finance-related disputes, they must inevitably address the question of
their role and function in financial market regulation. Such questions are rooted in the
larger socio-legal dispute processing debate examining how institutional dispute
resolution mechanisms effectively regulate the repeat player knowledge/power gap
through appropriate policies and procedures. Using the example of Hong Kong in
comparison with financial dispute resolution models currently in existence in the United
Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, and the United States, this article finds that the
appropriateness of a dispute resolution method is arguably informed by whether it takes
on a regulatory or non-regulatory role. Regulatory dispute resolution modes taking on
inquisitorial elements may be preferred when displacing the judicial function as they
incorporate safeguards for disputants against the discretion of the third party intervener.
But even for non-regulatory schemes, inquisitorial elements aimed at addressing the
power/knowledge gap including suggesting the provision of information regarding
relevant standards and rules, at least as touchstones, may still be incorporated into
consensual models of dispute resolution, which aim to ensure a de minimis level of equity
and fairness in the process.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, Hong Kong’s
regulators proposed to create a Financial Dispute Resolution Center
(“FDRC”) for the purposes of deploying and centralizing alternative dispute
resolution techniques in Hong Kong’s financial markets.1 In recent times,
legal scholars have offered important insights in the area of designing
†

Assistant Professor and Deputy Director, L.L.M. in Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, Faculty of
Law, University of Hong Kong; B.A., Stanford University; M.A., Landegg University; J.D., Boalt Hall
School of Law; Ph.D., Jurisprudence and Social Policy, University of California at Berkeley. The authors
thank the Government of Hong Kong’s University Grants Committee for its kind support through its Public
Policy Research Grant (HKU7001-PPR-10).
††
Barrister-at-Law, New Chambers, Hong Kong.
1
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INVESTOR
EDUCATION COUNCIL AND A FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE (2010), available at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/fa/papers/facb1-1127-1-e.pdf.
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effective and efficient systems of dispute resolution in diverse sectors.2 This
article will focus in particular on practical and principle based considerations
relevant to the design of Hong Kong’s Financial Dispute Resolution Center.
In comparing the key elements of the proposal for Hong Kong with
dispute resolution schemes for financial markets of other
jurisdictions―specifically, the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore and
the United States―two related issues arise. First, what is the role of dispute
resolution in financial markets and their regulation? Second, which
alternative dispute resolution techniques are most appropriate for use in
financial markets and what is their level of appropriateness, not only in
resolving disputes, but also in light of the role dispute resolution plays in
financial markets and their regulation? The United Kingdom, United States,
Australia, and Singapore are selected since they represent two very different
approaches to financial dispute resolution in well-developed financial
centers: one is an ombudsman-based system (United Kingdom and
Australia) and the other is an arbitration model (United States and
Singapore).3
The well-documented importance of the rule of law to Hong Kong’s
financial markets is evidenced by the fact that financial services disputes of
the highest orders occur and are resolved in Hong Kong (e.g., the recent
“Congo” case at the Court of Final Appeal4 concerning the enforceability of
debts against the Democratic Republic of Congo in Hong Kong courts).
However, the financial crisis demonstrated the limits of the existing methods
of dispute resolution. Calls for the establishment of an affordable and
2
See, e.g., WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT 41-64 (1988); Janet Martinez & Stephanie
Smith, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 123 (2009); CATHY A.
COSTANTINO ET AL., DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE
AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice
in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 1 (2009); THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 61-168 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999); Richard C. Rueben,
Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 11
(2005); Jill Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 329 (2006); John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69 (2002); Sharon Press,
Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View from the Field, 81 KY. L.J. 1029
(1992); Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and MediationWorldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553 (2004); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute
Systems Design and Transitional Justice, 13 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 329 (2008); Carrie J. Meadow, Are
There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons
From International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 195, 195-231 (2009).
3
For further elaboration, please see SHAHLA F. ALI, CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT: PRINCIPLES, SYSTEMS AND PRACTICE (forthcoming 2013).
4
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ors v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] FACV 5, 6,
7/2010 (H.K.).
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efficient method of dispute resolution arising from the crisis thus address
themselves towards the first issue: dispute resolution is necessary for
financial markets not only in providing assurance that disputes over financial
rights and legal obligations can be determined by an independent arbiter, and
give rise to enforceable remedies, but beyond that is a greater need for
accessibility―particularly for consumers. Hong Kong’s financial markets
are characterized by high numbers and high levels of participation by private
individual investors at the retail level, giving rise to its “short-term outlook
and quasi-gambling nature.”5 It is these private investors on the retail level
which the proposal addresses―disputes between consumers and financial
service providers. Improving accessibility to justice, or the ease with which
investors may protect their own rights in financial markets, not only serves
to enhance market participation and capitalization via increased consumer
confidence, but also serves to enhance market efficiency by lowering the
amount of resources that need to be dedicated to the resolution of disputes.
This, in turn, could potentially lead to a redistribution of those resources
back into capitalization of the financial market.
More specifically, in the context of the regulation of financial markets,
the introduction of alternative dispute resolution, (i.e., alternative to the
judicial system) while clearly furthering market efficiency by lowering the
resource-intensiveness of resolving financial disputes, raises the issue of
whether or not alternative forms of dispute resolution necessarily play the
same role as the courts in standard-setting and norms for consumer
protection. In every jurisdiction, the role of alternative dispute resolution in
a regulatory context seems to differ, leading to the question of whether or
not it is desirable for alternative dispute resolution in financial markets to
have an ad hoc regulatory role in trying to achieve consistency of outcomes
and awards.
With regards to market efficiency, determining an appropriate method
of dispute resolution thus becomes doubly important, as the shortcomings of
an ineffective dispute resolution method could well lead to an adverse effect
not just on consumer confidence, but market efficiency, as well as an
increase in the amount of resources dedicated to and associated with dispute
resolution.
As Hong Kong moves toward the development of a centralized,
systemized, alternative dispute resolution scheme at the retail level, it may
well benefit from the experience of other jurisdictions in being able to

5

BERRY HSU ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS IN HONG KONG: LAW AND PRACTICE (2006).
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design an alternative dispute resolution scheme that is both appropriate for
its financial markets, and also for its regulatory system.
II.

BACKGROUND

At the end of 2008, the world experienced what is considered to be the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The effects of
the crisis manifested in Hong Kong in a number of ways, of which the most
prominently featured in local media was the Minibonds Crisis, in respect to
which the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) and the Securities
and Futures Commission (“SFC”) received over 16,000 complaints and
resulted in many protests and demonstrations.6 In response, the Hong Kong
government set out to establish a dispute resolution mechanism to handle
complaints arising out of the crisis.
A.

Resolving the Minibonds Crisis and Dispute Resolution in Hong Kong

At the heart of the Minibonds Crisis was whether or not the risks
associated with these complex products were fully disclosed and
communicated to the retail investors who purchased them. This gave rise to
two complaints in particular: first, the way in which Minibonds had been
sold to the retail market, particularly by the banks carrying on securities
business; and second, their suitability for particular customers given their
complexity.
As a result of these complaints, retail investors who had purchased
Minibonds felt they were entitled to the return of the principal invested
following the filing for bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which triggered the
unwinding of the Minibonds―leading to their value falling to little more
than a fraction of the principal. In late September and early October 2008,
hundreds of Minibond investors took to the streets of Hong Kong’s central
business district in protest, and also staged demonstrations at the offices and
branches of distributing banks.
In response, on October 2, 2008, the Hong Kong Association of Banks
formed a task force on Lehman-related investment products.7 On October 6,
2008, the Hong Kong government proposed that the distributing banks buy

6
Hong Kong Democratic Foundation, Proposal for Resolution of Mini-Bond Issue (Nov. 2008),
http://www.hkdf.org/pr.asp?func=show&pr=178 (last visited May 1, 2012).
7
The Hong Kong Association of Banks, The Hong Kong Association of Banks Sets Up Task Force
to Follow Up Lehman Brothers Incident (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.hkab.org.hk/DisplayWhatsNewsAction
.do?ss=1&id=37 (last visited May 1, 2012).
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back the Minibonds at market price, to which the Task Force agreed. 8
However, legal hurdles in the form of the relevant United States bankruptcy
laws prevented the liquidation of the Minibonds, which would have been
necessary for the buy-back.9 A cease-and-desist letter was issued in respect
to the liquidation of the Minibonds on November 25, 2008, leading to an
announcement by distributing banks that they would be prepared to finance
the trustee for the Minibonds up to $100 million to assist its performance of
its duties to protect the interests of Minibond investors.10
1.

Regulatory Gap

Article 109 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong requires that “the
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide
an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the
status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre.”11 In particular, in
respect to the financial retail market, it serves to highlight the importance of
Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center in its enshrinement in
a constitutional document.
The day-to-day regulation of Hong Kong’s financial markets is
generally sectoral, with a separate regulator for each sector (i.e., HKMA for
banks and banking, SFC for securities and futures institutions and markets,
and the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (“OCI”) for insurance
business). One notable exception to the sectoral approach of Hong Kong’s
regulatory system is the oversight of the HKMA of all activities of banks,
including their business in securities or insurance. The HKMA regulates the
banks in these areas using the same rules and standards that are applied by
the sector regulators, i.e., the SFC and OCI, but banks are otherwise
regulated on an institutional basis.
Unlike in Singapore, where the Monetary Authority of Singapore
announced on January 16, 2009 that financial institutions who had
fraudulently sold Minibonds would make full or partial settlement to 58% of
8

Legislative Council, Background Brief on the Lehman Brothers Minibonds Collateral Recovery
Agreement and Related Issues (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1011/english/panels/fa/papers/fa
0421cb1-1979-e.pdf (last visited May 1, 2012).
9
REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON ISSUES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION
OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP COMPANIES 6 (2008), available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/new/lehman/lehman_report.pdf.
10
Id.; see also Letter from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP to U.S. Bank Corporate Trust ServicesCDO Group (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www.pwchk.hk/webmedia/doc/634354518955653280_mi
nibonds_doc_wgm_nov2008.pdf.
11
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Art. 109 (promulgated by the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997), available at
http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text.pdf.
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complainants—with 25% receiving all of the principal invested while 33%
would receive at least part of their principal—the powers of the regulators in
Hong Kong do not extend to direct interventions on behalf of consumers in
consumer disputes. As was noted in an earlier review of banking consumer
protection by the HKMA:
A key difference between Hong Kong and the other two
comparison jurisdictions is that the regulators in both the UK
and Australia have been given an explicit mandate in relation to
the protection of consumers of financial and banking services.
In the case of Hong Kong, the HKMA only has a general duty
to ‘provide a measure of protection to depositors’ under the
Banking Ordinance (Cap.155). There is no explicit mandate
with respect to consumer protection.12
A similar provision is found in the Securities and Futures Ordinance
(Cap.571) in respect to the functions of the SFC: “to secure an appropriate
degree of protection for members of the public investing in or holding
financial products . . . .”13
Consumer complaints or disputes are instead dealt with in the Code of
Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the SFC, which applies
to all persons licensed by the SFC to conduct regulated activities such as
dealing in securities.14 The Code of Conduct also applies to banks registered
with the SFC to carry out such activities. Under section 12.3 of the Code of
Conduct:
A registered person should ensure that: (a) complaints from
clients relating to its business are handled in a timely and
appropriate manner; (b) steps are taken to investigate and
respond promptly to the complaints; and (c) where a complaint
is not remedied promptly, the client is advised of any further
steps which may be available to the client under the regulatory
system.15
12
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Comparative Study on Banking Consumer Protection and
Competition Arrangements in the UK, Australia and Hong Kong: An Introductory Note 3-4 (Apr. 27, 2001),
available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-01/english/panels/fa/papers/a1112e02.pdf.
13
Securities and Futures Ordinance (2003), Cap. 571, 5 § (1)(1) (H.K.).
14
Under Schedule 5 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, the ten types of regulated activities are:
dealing in securities, dealing in futures contracts, leveraged foreign exchange trading, advising on securities,
advising on futures contracts, advising on corporate finance, providing automated trading services,
securities margin financing, asset management and credit ratings services. Id.
15
Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures
Commission (2010), § 12.3 (H.K.).
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Little information has been made available as to whether or not
Minibond complainants had made use of internal complaints systems (if
any) of the Minibond distributors, what the results of those complaints were,
and how the internal complaints systems of the distributors might interact
with the regulatory system. This left Minibond complainants to contend
with the various modes of dispute resolution in Hong Kong.
2.

Courts, Litigation, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Culture in
Hong Kong

While the court system in Hong Kong is well established, the lack of a
centralized dispute resolution scheme for Hong Kong’s financial industry
may be attributed to the nascent exposure to alternative dispute resolution in
Hong Kong, specifically mediation. With the exception of arbitration, which
is governed by the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609), 16 “other ADR
processes such as mediation do not have any statutory procedures and
operation” 17 in Hong Kong. In particular, the lack of knowledge and
experience with alternative dispute resolution procedures amongst legal
professionals in Hong Kong is attributed to the traditional legal environment
and culture in which these lawyers are trained and practice.18 Alternative
dispute resolution is currently an elective subject in law school curriculum.
Due to this voluntary participation, the number of practicing lawyers who
had mediation training in 2007 was cited as 0.08%.19
Furthermore, litigation remains the first choice for individuals and
commercial enterprises where courts are better equipped to understand the
legal dispute, where there is a desire for authoritative and legal precedent
(which would be thus binding on similar cases), and where court procedures
allow for judgments to be obtained quickly and cheaply, as may be the case
in proceedings such as summary judgment.20 Civil litigation was reported to
have been initiated by Minibond investors in several cases between 2008 and
200921—the first lawsuits of their type. However, greater progress appears
16

Pre Arbitration Ordinance (2011), Cap. 609 (H.K.).
Gu Weixia, Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong: Challenges and Opportunities for Development of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 40 H.K. L.J. 43, 52 (2010).
18
Id.
19
Chan Bing Woon & Oscar Tan, Building a Mediation Culture in Hong Kong, ASIAN DISP. REV.
126 (2007) (though this figure has almost certainly risen since the Civil Justice Reforms came into force).
20
Gary Soo, Yun Zhao & Dennis Cai, Better Ways of Resolving Disputes in Hong Kong―Some
Insights from the Lehman-Brothers Related Investment Product Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme,
9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137 (2010).
21
Amy Nip, Two Investors Reach Settlement With Bank Before Court Case, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 11, 2008, at A4, available at http://www.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx; Patsy
17
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to have been made in criminal litigation related to the Minibonds Crisis than
civil litigation. In January 2010, a former Dah Sing Bank employee was
charged with forging a customer’s signature to buy Minibonds from the
bank. 22 In April 2010, two staff members of the Bank of China (Hong
Kong) were charged by the Commercial Crimes Bureau for misleading and
inducing customers to purchase structured products such as the Minibonds,23
though they were subsequently acquitted.24
Cases have also been taken to the Small Claims Tribunal, a court that
deals quickly, informally, and inexpensively with claims not exceeding
HK$50,000. Rules and procedures are less strict than other courts, and no
legal representation is allowed. One hundred thirty-five Minibond investors
whose claims did not exceed $50,000 sought to recover money against banks
in the Tribunal. 25 The adjudicator, having heard all the cases, came to
conclusion that the claims should be referred to the District Court, as the
cases concerned banks’ responsibilities and risks to consumers, involving
new and complicated legal points which would have an impact on the public
banking sector. The lack of precedent and the fact that the Tribunal might
not have had the legal power to handle such cases also contributed to the
decision to refer the cases to the district court.26
Driven by its incorporation into civil court procedure during the Civil
Justice Reform, alternative dispute resolution and mediation in particular is
now receiving much greater attention in Hong Kong. The success of
existing court-annexed mediation schemes, such as the pilot scheme for
family mediation27 and construction disputes,28 has led to the extension of
such schemes into various facets of civil procedure.29 Alternative dispute
resolution is explicitly incorporated under Order 25 of the Rules of the High
Court (Cap. 4A, Sub.Leg.). 30 Order 25 deals with case management
Moy, Lehman Investor to Get her Day in Court, THE STANDARD, Sept. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?sid=25487561&art_id=88391&con_type=1&pp_cat=30.
22
Bank Staff Arrested over Minibonds, LEHMAN VICTIMS ALLIANCE, Mar. 27, 2010, available at
http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/bank-staff-arrested-over-minibonds7571.php.
23
Id.
24
HKSAR v. Chu Lai Sze [2010] HCMA 527/2010; HKSAR v. Tai Ching [2011] DCCC 527 &
1272/2010; Re Cheung Kwai Kwai [2011] DCCC 526/2010.
25
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 65.
26
Id.
27
Civil Justice Reform-Interim Report, Interim Report of the Chief Justice’s Working Party on Civil
Justice Reform, para. 666 (Nov. 21, 2001), available at http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk/ir/paperHTML/Wor
kingParty.html.
28
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, FINAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S WORKING PARTY ON CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM, para. 831 (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0607/english/bc/bc57/papers/bc570611cb2-1960-e.pdf.
29
Id. para. 797, n.640.
30
Rules of the High Court (1989), Cap.4A, O.25 (H.K.).
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summons and conferences, the means by which the High Court sets out the
details of proceedings prior to their commencement. 31 Amongst the
requirements in Order 25 is the mandatory completion of the timetabling
questionnaire that is filed by the parties on the close of pleadings.32 The first
section of the questionnaire deals with alternative dispute resolution, and
requires the parties to either: 1) confirm they have attempted to settle the
case by alternative dispute resolution but were not successful, or that they
have no intention of settling the case, or that they are willing to try to settle
the case by alternative dispute resolution or other means and thus request a
stay of the proceedings, 2) confirm they have filed a mediation certificate, or
3) confirm they have filed a mediation notice/response.33 The mediation
certificate sets out whether or not parties are willing to attempt mediation to
settle the proceedings, and the reasons if the party is not willing.34 Where
parties wish to attempt mediation, they should file a mediation notice,35 and
in response, the other party to the proceedings will file a mediation
response.36 Under Practice Direction 31 on Mediation, the court may make
adverse costs orders against parties who unreasonably fail to engage in
mediation.37
3.

The Consumer Council

Established in 1974, the Consumer Council provides consumer
complaint and inquiry services, though it has no powers of adjudication or
investigation itself. Complaints about the Minibonds were made to the
Consumer Council, leading to the creation of a special workforce to handle
Lehman Brothers Cases on October 30, 2008.38 The workforce was tasked
with identifying cases for consideration of financial assistance for legal
action under the Consumer Legal Action Fund (“CLAF”).39 According to
the press release issued by the Consumer Council, the criteria for financial
31

Id.
Id., r.1.
33
Id. Annex A (Practice Direction 5.2 on Case Management).
34
Id. App. B (Practice Direction 31 on Mediation).
35
Id. App. C.
36
Id. App. D.
37
HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION, CIRCULAR NO. 097/10 (Sept. 27, 2010), available at
http://hkbademo.zmallplanet.com/members/circulars/2010/2010097.pdf.
The Circular has, however,
suggested that some practitioners were approaching court-mandated mediation processes as a mere
formality preceding litigation rather than making genuine efforts to reach settlement. Id.
38
Consumer Council, Consumer Council Has Put in Place a Special Workforce to Handle the
Lehman Brothers Cases (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/news/pre
ss_releases/2008103001.html.
39
Id.
32
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assistance included: vulnerability of the complainants, cogency of evidence
on untoward sales tactics, inadequate risk disclosure, and
misrepresentation. 40
The process involved interviewing selected
complainants, conducting a preliminary legal analysis, and reporting to the
CLAF Management Committee for recommendation to the Board of
Administrators for approval.41 A portion of the work was commissioned to
barristers in private practice in order to expedite the process.42 By the end of
2008, the Consumer Council reported it had received some 8,274 complaints
in respect to Minibonds, which contributed to a tenfold increase in
complaints against financial services for that year.43 At the end of 2009, the
number of complaints received by the Consumer Council against financial
services was 4,968. 44 One of the key difficulties for consumers in
complaining to the Consumer Council is that referral to the CLAF would
simply direct complainants back to the litigation system.45
4.

Assisted Negotiations

On December 9, 2008, the Democratic Party announced that it had
assisted over sixty investors, reaching settlements totaling $30 million in
compensation from fourteen of the distributing banks. 46 The range of
compensation was described as “wide” and the average percentage of
principal received in compensation was described as “high,” but was not
disclosed.47 The settlements were attributed to the fact that the cases all
involved regulation violations; however, resolved cases represented less than
1% of the total number of complaints at the time.48

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Consumer
Council,
Year
Ender
2008
(Jan.
19,
2009),
available
at
http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/news/press_releases/2009011901.html.
44
Consumer Council, Public Education Proved to be Effective: Consumer Complaints Alleviated in
2010 (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/news/press_releases/201101
2701.html.
45
“The Fund aims to . . . assist consumers to bring or defend representative action.” CONSUMER
COUNCIL, INFORMATION PAMPHLET ON CONSUMER LEGAL ACTION FUND (June 2003), available at
http://www.consumer.org.hk/website/ws_en/legal_protection/consumer_legal_actions_fund/CLAFBriefPD
F.pdf.
46
Democratic Party, 成功促使 60 宗雷曼個案和解涉及金額近 3,000 萬港元: 民主黨介紹銀
行 和 解 進 度 和 特 點 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.dphk.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/10/081209PRESS.pdf.
47
Id.
48
Id.
41
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The Minibonds Mediation and Arbitration Scheme

On October 31, 2008, the HKMA announced a mediation and
arbitration scheme administered by the HKIAC for complainants in respect
to Lehman-related investment products distributed by banks (“the
Scheme”). 49 The Scheme applied to issues of compensation between
investors in Lehman Brothers-related products and banks licensed by the
HKMA, and it was specifically limited to investors who had made
complaints to the HKMA, and whose complaints were referred to the SFC
or, if there had been a finding, against a relevant individual or executive
officer of a bank against whom a complaint was made. 50 The HKMA
informed such eligible investors in writing, and would pay half the fee of the
service, with the other half being borne by the relevant bank.51
However, the HKIAC also offered a similar service, using the same
procedures applicable to the Scheme, to investors who were not eligible
under the above criteria, if the relevant bank consented to take part, though
the costs would have to be borne by the parties themselves.
The procedure involved a preparatory meeting followed by mediation
and, in the event mediation was unsuccessful, arbitration. 52 Before the
dispute resolution process began, parties would attend preparatory meetings
to familiarize themselves with the mediation process, explore settlement
options, and exchange information and documents. The first step of the
Scheme involved mediation, by which the mediator would attempt to assist
the parties in reaching a negotiated settlement, or if that were not possible, to
narrow the issues in dispute, in particular, to agree on common facts that
may be used in subsequent arbitration or litigation. In the event that the
mediation was unsuccessful, the parties could then elect to arbitrate, which
would be binding on both parties. Another person that is not the mediator
would be appointed as arbitrator, and conduct a documents-only arbitration
to the extent possible. The arbitrator’s decision would be final. This
procedure, however, was not intended for use in all disputes; in particular, it
was not intended for use in those involving complex issues or requiring the
examination of witnesses.53
49

Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Lehman-Brothers-Related Products Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration Scheme (Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/keyinformation/press-releases/2008/20081031-5.shtml (last visited May 1, 2012).
50
Id.
51
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Explanatory Note on the Scheme (Oct. 31, 2008),
http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/other-information/lehman/explanatory_b.shtml (last visited May 6, 2012).
52
Shahla F. Ali & John Koon Wang, After Lehman: International Response to Financial Disputes–
A Focus on Hong Kong, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 151 (2011).
53
Id.
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According to the HKIAC’s Year-End Report for 2009, a total of 334
cases were referred to the Scheme, of which 243 were handled. 54 As of
December 31, 2009, eighty-six cases went through mediation with seventyfive achieving settlement. 55 Thirty-seven cases were settled by direct
negotiation.56 No cases were referred to arbitration.57
6.

Regulator-Negotiated Mass Settlement and Subsequent Top-Up

It was the intervention of the regulators that proved the most effective
in respect to driving settlement forward. In early 2009, Sun Hung Kai
Investment Services and KGI Asia voluntarily offered to repurchase the
Minibonds after the SFC raised a number of concerns in respect to the
Minibond sales practices, which formed the basis of reprimands from the
SFC. The repurchases were completed on July 2, 2009, and clients of both
securities broker distributors recovered the principal amounts invested.58
On July 22, 2009, an agreement was reached between the SFC,
HKMA, and sixteen of the distributing banks, whereby the banks offered to
repurchase the Minibonds at a price equal to 60% of the original investment
amount for their customers below the age of sixty-five, and at 70% for those
above the age of sixty-five. Investors who had previously reached
settlements with the banks would also receive ex gratia payments to bring
their settlement amounts in line with the agreed settlement rate. In
exchange, the distributing banks admitted no liability, and furthermore, the
SFC discontinued its investigations into the sale and distribution of
Minibonds by the banks. The HKMA also informed the banks of its
intention not to take any enforcement action in respect to the banks whose
customers accepted the offer.59
Approximately 24,168 Minibond investors accepted the repurchase
scheme, for which approximately 97% qualified. A further 4,800 Minibond
54

GARY SOO, HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, YEAR-END REPORT FOR 2009
SECRETARIAT 2-3 (Nov. 23, 2009), available at http://www.hkiac.org/qwert/images/stories/news
pdf/HKIAC_Year_End_Report_for_2009_from_Secretariat.pdf.
55
Anthony Connerty, Lehman Lessons, 160 NEW L.J. 948, 967 (2010).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Securities and Futures Commission, Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Ltd Agrees with SFC to
Repurchase Minibonds From Its Clients at Original Value, SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS, Jan. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR8; KGI Asia Ltd
Agrees with SFC to Repurchase Minibonds from Its Clients at Original Value, SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS,
Apr. 5, 2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR39.
59
Securities and Futures Commission, SFC, HKMA and 16 banks reach agreement on Minibonds,
SFC ENFORCEMENT NEWS, July 22, 2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDoc
Servlet?docno=09PR100.
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investors who reached settlements before the offer was made in July also
received top-up payments.60
Thereafter, an agreement on the same terms in respect to
compensation was reached between the SFC and Grand Cathay Securities on
December 17, 2009, 61 bringing an end to investigations of all nineteen
Minibond distributors.
Several days later, on December 23, 2009, the SFC, the HKMA, Dah
Sing Bank, and Mevas Bank reached an agreement in respect to equitylinked fixed coupon principal protected notes (“Notes”) issued by Lehman
Brothers, whereby the two banks would repurchase the Notes at 80% of the
principal amount and also bring earlier settlements in line with that amount.
Both the SFC and the HKMA agreed not to take any enforcement action
against the two banks.62
On January 13, 2010, the SFC reached an agreement with Karl
Thomson Investment Consultants―who were not distributors of Minibonds
but had purchased and consequently sold them to eleven clients. Karl
Thomson agreed to repurchase the Minibonds on the same terms agreed
upon by the banks, the SFC, and the HKMA under the July 22, 2009
settlement. This may be contrasted with the voluntary repurchases offered
by SHK Investment Services and KGI Asia.63
On March 27, 2011, the sixteen distributing banks announced a joint
proposal along with the receivers of the Minibond collateral for the
distribution of the net value of the underlying collateral assets and an ex
gratia top-up payment to Minibond investors, estimated on average to bring
the value of compensation to 85% and 96.5% of the principal amounts
invested, respectively. This has resulted in the disparity between the
settlements made by securities intermediaries that are directly regulated by
the SFC, and those made by the registered institutions, such as banks, that

60

Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Progress of the HKMA’s Investigations in
Lehman Brothers Related Cases, HKMA, Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/2
00910/30/P200910300277.htm.
61
Press Release, Securities and Futures Commission, SFC Completes Investigations of All 19
Minibond Distributors, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServ
let?docno=09PR176.
62
Press Release, Securities and Futures Commission, SFC, HKMA, Dah Sing Bank Ltd,. and Mevas
Bank Ltd. Resolve Issues Concerning Lehman Equity Index-linked Principal Protected Notes, Dec. 23,
2009, available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR178.
63
Press Release, Securities And Futures Commission, SFC Reaches Agreement With Karl Thomson
Investment Consultants Ltd. Concerning Sale of Lehman Brothers Minibonds, Jan. 13, 2010, available at
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=10PR5.
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are regulated primarily by the HKMA based on the regulations established
by the SFC being reduced.64
7.

The Recommendations of the Regulators

In response to the Minibonds Crisis, the Financial Secretary requested
that both the HKMA and the SFC prepare reports in respect to issues arising
from the crisis. The reports were delivered and published in December
2008.
The issue of dispute resolution is specifically dealt with in Section 35
(“Dispute resolution”) of the SFC’s Report to the Financial Secretary on
Issues Raised by the Lehmans Minibonds Crisis, and in paragraphs 5.2 and
5.3 on “Remedies available to investors” and paragraphs 8.44 to 8.50 on
“Recommendations” in the Report of the HKMA on Issues Concerning the
Distribution of Structured Products Connected to Lehman Group
Companies. 65
Both the SFC and the HKMA noted that one of the issues raised by
the Minibonds Crisis was the lack of any quick, simple, or efficient means
by which disputes could be resolved. The HKMA particularly noted that the
role of the regulators in receiving complaints is confined to ensuring
compliance with regulatory requirements, but there was no power to
adjudicate disputes or order compensation.
The SFC suggested in its report that a dispute resolution scheme
should be “simple, consumer friendly, and free of charge (or substantially
so)” 66 while the HKMA noted that dispute resolution mechanisms are
available in other jurisdictions for low cost.67 The SFC also suggested that
such a scheme should be made mandatory under the Code of Conduct by
specifying a right to dispute resolution procedures under client agreements,
but should avoid unduly legalistic procedures and discourage the
involvement of legal representatives. It also suggested that a financial
ombudsman would need to be empowered to order compensation.68
64

Securities and Futures Commission, SFC and HKMA Welcome Minibond Collateral Recovery
Agreement,
SFC
ENFORCEMENT
NEWS,
Mar.
27,
2011,
available
at
http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=11PR35.
65
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEHMANS MINIBONDS CRISIS:
REPORT TO THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY (2008), available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/general/general/
lehman/Review Report/Review Report.pdf.
66
Id. para. 35.3.
67
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, REPORT OF THE HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORITY ON ISSUES
CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURED PRODUCTS CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP COMPANIES
6 (2008), available at http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/other-information/lehman_report.pdf.
68
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEHMANS MINIBONDS CRISIS:
REPORT TO THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, supra note 65.
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The HKMA noted that such a scheme would reduce pressure on the
regulators’ limited resources, particularly where the incidents generated
large numbers of complaints, but if such a scheme were to be introduced,
protocols would also be needed where systemic issues arose.
B.

The Proposal of the FDRC and Comparison with Schemes in Four
Jurisdictions

The recommendations made by the SFC and HKMA in their
respective reports gave rise to a proposal in February 2010 by the Financial
Services and the Treasury Bureau (“FSTB”) in respect to the establishment
of the FDRC. The FSTB conducted a study of dispute resolution schemes
for the financial industries of four jurisdictions: the United Kingdom,
Australia, Singapore, and the United States. The four dispute resolution
schemes considered were the Financial Ombudsman Service of the United
Kingdom (“FOS (UK)”), the Financial Ombudsman Service of Australia
(“FOS (Aus)”), the Financial Industry Dispute Resolution Centre
(“FIDReC”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”),
respectively.
1.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services and Markets Act of
2000 consolidated the regulation of financial services and markets under the
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), a single regulator for the entire
financial industry.69 A consolidated statutory dispute resolution scheme was
also created―the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”).70
Eight independent ombudsmen and complaint-handling schemes were
incorporated into the FOS (UK), including the Insurance Ombudsman
Bureau (as the insurance division of the FOS), the Personal Investment
Authority and the Securities and Futures Authority Complaints Bureau (as
the investment division of the FOS (UK)), and the Banking Ombudsman and
the Building Societies Ombudsman (as the banking and loans division of the
FOS (UK)).71

69

Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), cl. 8 (U.K.).
Under the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), § 16, sch. 17, cl. 8 (U.K.) and the
Consumer Credit Act (2006), § 59, cl. 14 (U.K.), the FOS (UK) is set up as the statutory dispute-resolution
scheme.
71
FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1999-2000
(2000), available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/first-annual-report/ar-19992000.pdf.
70
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Australia

Responsibility for the regulation of financial markets in Australia is
primarily split between the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (“ASIC”) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.
On July 1, 2008, three of the largest existing complaints schemes in the
financial services industry of Australia were consolidated into a centralized
financial dispute resolution scheme approved by ASIC.72 The Banking and
Financial Services Ombudsman, the Insurance Ombudsman Service, and the
Financial Industry Complaints Service were merged into a single external
dispute resolution service under a newly created company.73 On January 1,
2009, the Credit Union Dispute Resolution Centre and Insurance Brokers
Disputes Limited were also merged to become the Mutual division and the
Insurance Broking divisions, respectively.74
In addition to the Financial Ombudsman Service, another external
dispute resolution scheme has recently emerged from obscurity in respect to
financial advice and investment-related disputes―the Credit Ombudsman
Service Limited (“COSL”). The COSL was originally incorporated as the
Mortgage Industry Ombudsman Service Limited in 2003, before adopting its
present name in 2004.75 It provides a free dispute resolution service for
consumer complaints against its members, which include non-bank lenders,
finance brokers, credit unions, building societies, debt collection firms,
financial planners, trustees, servicers, aggregators, and mortgage managers,
among others.76 It was in the past considered an external dispute resolution
scheme only for the mortgage broking industry, but this was the result of
misinformation and the investment industry’s relative ignorance of its
existence.77 However, financial advisory and investment groups appear to
be taking greater notice of the scheme, which has also had its profile raised
by the introduction of the national consumer credit regime in Australia.

72
FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, INQUIRY INTO COLLAPSES IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?u
rl=corporations_ctte/fps/submissions/sub388.pdf.
73
Id.
74
The Financial Ombudsman Service Establishes Mutuals and Insurance Broking Divisions
FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.fos.org.au/centric/home_page/news/the_financial_ombuds
man_service_establishes_mutuals_and_insurance_broking_divisions.jsp (last visited May 1, 2012).
75
COSL’s History, CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.cosl.com.au/COSLs-History (last
visited May 1, 2012).
76
COSL’s Role, CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, http://www.cosl.com.au/COSLs-Role (last visited
May 1, 2012).
77
Lucinda Beaman, FOS Alternative Emerges, MONEY MGMT. (July 23, 2010),
http://www.moneymanagement.com.au/news/fos-alternative-emerges.
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The existence of two competing dispute resolution schemes, as noted
by the COSL head of operations and chairman,78 is inherently positive for
consumers and financial service providers, particularly in encouraging
competitiveness in lowering the costs of dispute resolution and enhancing
consumer protection via the broad range of disputes covered by the two
schemes.
Due to the similarity between FOS (Aus) and the COSL, for the
purposes of this article, discussion in respect to Australia will focus on FOS
(Aus).
3.

Singapore

The banking and insurance sectors of Singapore previously had in
place dispute resolution mechanisms―the Consumer Mediation Unit and the
Insurance Disputes Resolution Organization respectively—but there was no
such mechanism for its capital markets. A working group of capital markets
representatives concluded in 2003 that it would be more cost effective to
leverage the resources of existing schemes rather than to establish a new
scheme for capital markets given the relatively small number of complaints
in the capital markets sector.79
In May 2004, the Monetary Authority of Singapore formed an
Integration Steering Committee to facilitate the integration of dispute
resolution schemes for Singapore’s financial sector. 80 This integrated
scheme, the Financial Industry Dispute Resolution Centre, was aimed at
providing coverage for most retail consumer complaints in the financial
sector.81 It was officially launched on August 31, 2005.82
4.

United States

In the United States, self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) form an
integral part of federal statutory regulation of the securities industry.
78
“My Board and I are conscious that COSL is one of only two external dispute resolution (‘EDR’)
schemes operating in Australia with the approval of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(‘AISC’). It is a privilege that we do not take for granted and an acknowledgement that healthy
competition in the sector is vital to promote transparency and accountability and to discourage
complacency and mediocrity.” CREDIT OMBUDSMAN SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON OPERATIONS 2009–
2010 (2010), available at http://www.cosl.com.au/Resources/COSL/Files/AnnualReportOnOperations2010.pdf.
79
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DISPUTES RESOLUTION CENTRE
(“FIDREC”) (2004), available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/resource/publications/consult_papers/2004/Public
_Consultation_Paper_FIDReC.pdf.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DISPUTES RESOLUTION CENTRE LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006 (2006).
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Originally private sector membership organizations of securities industry
professionals that set standards of conduct for their members and disciplined
errant members, these organizations pre-date the federal securities laws in
1933 and 1934. Certain concepts of federal law were in fact lifted from
SRO regulation and became an added layer of regulation, while the SROs
themselves have been integrated into federal statutory regulation, with the
Securities Exchange Commission exercising oversight.83
Of particular note is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”), which consolidated the National Association of Securities
Dealers (“NASD”) and the member regulation, enforcement and arbitration
functions of New York Stock Exchange Regulation (“NYSE Regulation”).
The purpose of consolidating the two was to bring more efficiency to the
regulation of the securities industry by creating a single set of rules for
broker-dealers under FINRA. Following this merger, FINRA became the
largest non-governmental regulator for securities firms doing business in the
United States.84 Its role includes market oversight, salesperson regulation,
investor education, enforcement, and arbitration. This differs from the
ombudsmen used in the three common law jurisdictions, as an ombudsman
exists only to provide an extra-judicial route to resolving disputes, whereas
an SRO may have a much wider range of regulatory functions in respect to
its members, of which dispute resolution may only be a small part.
III.

THE PROPOSED FINANCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER

The key features of the proposed FDRC are 1) the creation of a FDRC
to administer a financial dispute resolution scheme, 2) a two-tiered financial
dispute resolution scheme whereby disputes are first mediated, and if
mediation fails, arbitrated, 3) participation in the scheme by financial
institutions regulated or licensed by the SFC or the HKMA, 4) a
HK$500,000 cap on claims under the scheme, 5) a “pay-as-you-use” charge
to both claimants and institutions, with higher fees payable by financial
institutions, and 6) the FDRC would not be empowered with any
investigatory or disciplinary powers.
While the proposal bears some resemblance to the Scheme, key
differences include a ceiling on claims, charges to complainants as well as
service providers, the exclusion of Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) and
83

Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered
Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008).
84
Karen Powell, Business Law: What Montana Lawyers Need to Know About FINRA, 33 MONT. L.
REV. 31 (2008).
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insurance disputes, and systemic concerns being passed back to the
regulators for investigation.
A.

Jurisdiction

Not every dispute may be submitted to financial dispute resolution
schemes―restrictions are often imposed to exclude certain types of
complainant or certain types of dispute. Further to the distinction between
the retail and wholesale financial markets, restrictions are applied even
within the retail market.85 The proposed jurisdiction of the FDRC must thus
be considered in the context of the limitations imposed on who may bring
disputes, and the types of dispute they may bring.
1.

Eligible Complainants

Complainants are restricted under the FDRC proposal to individual
consumers and sole proprietors.86 Some respondents to the consultation on
the proposal suggested that the eligible complainants should be expanded to
include small companies, to which the FSTB replied that the intention of the
FDRC was to “take care of the group who would need the service most,”
though the possibility of expanding the scope of coverage remains open.87
There may be a number of reasons for restricting eligible
complainants. As can be seen from the example of the United States in the
table below, as the FINRA arbitration process is entirely paid for by
complainants and securities firms, it was unnecessary to put in place
jurisdictional filters. Under the FINRA arbitration model, few of FINRA’s
resources are taken up by the dispute resolution process―by contrast, the
dispute resolution schemes in the common law jurisdictions are heavily
subsidized, giving rise to a need to limit eligible complainants to ensure that
the subsidies are taken up by those with the greatest need for them.
The restriction on eligible complainants for the FDRC is the same
restriction currently imposed in Singapore in respect to FIDReC, and is
perhaps unsurprising given that the FDRC is an entirely new scheme.
Equally, however, it should come as no surprise that respondents to the
consultation would have raised the issue of allowing small corporate bodies
to also be included in the scheme. It has long been an issue in Hong Kong
that the expense of civil litigation restricts the access to justice of small- and
medium-sized enterprises, described as part of the “sandwich” class by the
85
86
87

FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33-34.
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judiciary in addressing concerns about access to justice in civil litigation due
to high costs.88
It is unclear, however, why the proposed eligible complainants were
not determined with reference to persons who fall outside of the
“professional investor”89 definition that is used in the regulation of licensed
intermediaries, nor with reference to empirical evidence as to where the need
for such dispute resolution services may be most needed. The concept of
professional investors is found in the Code of Conduct, and exists to exempt
licensed intermediaries from certain investor protection requirements in
respect to market professionals (e.g., banks and insurance companies) and
high net worth individuals, who by virtue of their experience and resources
would be capable of making informed decisions and protecting their own
interests. The concept has equivalents in the four jurisdictions that were
studied by the FSTB. Under the FDRC proposal, market professionals
would be excluded from the eligible complainants, but high net worth
individuals would be included―despite the fact that they are considered
sufficiently well-resourced and experienced enough to be excluded from
certain regulatory requirements.
TABLE 1
SCHEME
FOS
(UK)

FOS
(Aus)
FIDReC
FINRA

88

ELIGIBLE COMPLAINANTS
A person who is a consumer, a micro-enterprise, a charity with an annual
income of less than £1 million, or a trustee of a trust with a net asset value
of less than £1 million.90 Certain types of complainant are expressly
excluded under the Rules.91
“Retail clients” per s.761G of the Corporations Act 2001, including small
businesses as defined under that section.92
FIDReC’s services are available to all consumers who are individuals or
sole-proprietors.93
Since FINRA complainants must pay an arbitration fee, a hearing deposit,
and attorneys' fees, cost-deterrence serves as a filter, and strict jurisdictional
prerequisites for arbitration are unnecessary.94

This has been commented upon by former Chief Justice Andrew Li in his final speech at the
Opening of the Legal Year Ceremony in 2010 and has also been remarked upon by him in previous
speeches.
89
See Securities and Futures Ordinance (2003), Part 1, sch.1 (H.K.).
90
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FSA HANDBOOK, DISP 2.7.3 (2012), available at
http://media.fsahandbook.info/pdf/DISP.pdf.
91
Id., DISP 2.7.9.
92
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION,
REGULATORY GUIDE
139 (2011), available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg139-published-20-42011.pdf/$file/rg139-published-20-4-2011.pdf.
93
The Jurisdiction of FIDReC, FIDREC, http://www.fidrec.com.sg/website/jurisdiction.html (last
visited May 1, 2012).
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RECOMMENDATION 1―ELIGIBLE COMPLAINANTS
Serious consideration should be given to the expansion of eligible
complainants beyond individuals in the proposal of the FDRC. This would
serve to address issues of access to justice for a class of potential
complainants that has already been identified by the Judiciary as being
vulnerable to the high costs of civil litigation.
Moreover, given the potential misallocation of resources,
consideration should also be given to restricting the subsidized access of
professional investors to the FDRC, perhaps by way of scaled charges for
FDRC services for different kinds of user.
2.

Range of Disputes

The proposed types of disputes the FDRC would handle would be
confined to those arising out of services provided by financial institutions
which are licensees or regulatees of the HKMA or the SFC that are
“monetary” in nature.95
a.

Exclusion of Commercial and Pricing Decisions and Cases Already
Subject to Court Proceedings

Specifically excluded from this jurisdiction would be commercial
decisions (such as the provision of credit or margin facilities), pricingrelated disputes (such as the setting of fees and interest rates), and cases that
have already been the subject of court proceedings.96 These exclusions are
largely in line with those in Australia and Singapore, and also those excluded
in the United Kingdom as well (see the table below for disputes that can be
dismissed without hearing).
b.

Exclusion of the Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) and Insurance

Also explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the FDRC are
insurance matters and Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) (i.e., retirement)
matters, due to the existence of a dispute resolution scheme for the insurance
sector, the Insurance Claims Complaints Bureau, and the lack of monetary
disputes in the MPF system.97
94
Cory Alpert, Financial Services in the United States and United Kingdom: Comparative
Approaches to Securities Regulation and Dispute Resolution, 5 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 75 (2008).
95
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 35-36.
96
Id. at 37.
97
Id. at 36.
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However, the FSTB clarified in the Consultation Conclusions that
where there are complaints relating to insurance and MPF products sold by
financial institutions within the jurisdiction of the FDRC, those complaints
will fall within the jurisdiction of the FDRC. Similar to the HKMA, the
jurisdiction of the FDRC would be institutional, rather than sectoral.98 It is
also clarified that the ultimate aim is for the scope of the FDRC to be
comprehensive, and thus the coverage of the FDRC will be reviewed from
time to time.99
While the financial dispute resolution schemes of other leading
jurisdictions were mergers of pre-existing, sectoral schemes, given that
alternative dispute resolution on a broad level is just beginning to mature in
Hong Kong, it is probably preferable that these disputes remain outside of
the jurisdiction of the FDRC at the moment. Insurance products in
particular, having their own dispute resolution scheme, could potentially
give rise to confusion if they are also made subject to the jurisdiction of the
FDRC. Moreover, as was seen in the Minibonds Crisis, there is potential for
overlapping jurisdictions to give rise to disparity of awards, which would
lead to consumer dissatisfaction. It should be noted that even in jurisdictions
where there is a single financial dispute resolution scheme, such as Australia
and Singapore, separate limits remain for insurance complaints.
3.

“Monetary Nature”―A Distinction That is Not Made in Any Other
Jurisdiction

Less clear, however, is the “monetary” dispute requirement.
Paragraph 3.4 of the Consultation Paper refers to coverage of the FDRC as
restricted to licensees and regulatees of the HKMA and the SFC “given that
most disputes of monetary nature involve the services in these two
sectors.” 100 Further enlightenment may be found in paragraph 3.10,
concerning initial enquiries in the FDRC procedure. Under sub-paragraph
(c), “[i]f the dispute also relates to other areas such as concerns about a
misconduct of the financial institution and/or its staff, the intake officers
would explain to the consumer what other channels are available for taking
the case forward.”101 It is thus presumed that the term “monetary dispute”
refers to complaints or the parts of complaints that exclusively concern
financial compensation for a complaint. In attempting to make this
98
99
100
101

Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 40.
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distinction, there is a clear indication that the intent behind the FDRC is to
avoid any regulatory implications arising from its process.
In the aftermath of the Minibonds Crisis, the attempt to draw a
distinction between the part of a complaint that only concerns financial
compensation, as opposed to other allegations that may concern regulatory
matters, is perhaps understandable. The distinction appears to be intended to
emphasize the non-regulatory role of the FDRC, which is to have no
investigative or disciplinary powers. As will be seen from the dispute
resolution procedures of the schemes in the other jurisdictions studied, this
may be out of line with the practices of many other jurisdictions, under
which investigations and findings of fact are made. The distinction is not
made in any of the other jurisdictions studied, and raises the issue of how a
decision about compensation can be accurately made without some
consideration of the underlying circumstances (including those that touch
upon regulatory matters) and apportionment of blame. Moreover, in light of
the experience of other jurisdictions, a further question is whether or not this
is an effective way to ensure the FDRC remains non-regulatory.
In response to discussion about the interface between the FDRC and
the regulators, the FSTB acknowledges that some disputes, which give rise
to monetary losses, inevitably involve complaints of misconduct, and thus
complainants are likely to pursue their complaints in parallel with both the
FDRC and the regulators. While the concern of the FSTB in this regard
appears to be to prevent any encroachment of the regulators’ jurisdiction by
the FDRC, the idea of running complaints in parallel raises a further issue of
whether or not awards made under the FDRC will need to be adjusted to
take into account findings of the regulators about the targeted financial
institutions. The adjustment to the settlement amount reached with the
banks in respect to the Minibonds Crisis is a relevant example of how
circumstances following settlement may have an impact on settlement
amounts, and the need to make provision for such changes in circumstance
in order to ensure the award amount reflects the circumstances accurately.
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TABLE 2
SCHEME
FOS
(UK)

FOS
(Aus)

FIDReC

FINRA

102

RANGE OF DISPUTES
The activities to which the compulsory jurisdiction of the FOS applies are
regulated activities (see section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000), payment services, consumer credit activities, lending money
secured by a charge on land, lending money, paying money by plastic card,
providing ancillary banking services or any activities including advice.102
The territorial scope of the compulsory jurisdiction is restricted to activities
carried on from an establishment in the U.K.103
The jurisdiction of the FOS (Aus) includes: complaints against financial
service providers from individual or individuals, partnerships comprised of
individuals, corporate trustees of self-managed superannuation funds or
family trust, small businesses, clubs or incorporated associations, policy
holders of group life or group general insurance policy where the dispute
relates to the payment of benefits under the policy; disputes that arise from
a contract or obligation under Australian law in respect to the provision of a
financial service, provision of a guarantee or security for financial
accommodation, entitlement or benefits under life insurance or general
insurance policies, legal or beneficial interests arising out of financial
investment or a financial risk facility, claims under motor vehicle insurance
policies. 104
FIDReC’s jurisdiction extends over all disputes brought by individuals and
sole proprietors against financial institutions who are members of FIDReC,
except disputes over commercial decisions (including pricing and other
policies, e.g., interest rates and fees), cases under investigation by any law
enforcement agency, and cases which have been subjected to a court
hearing, for which a judgment or order is passed.105
The FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedures for Customer Disputes applies
to any dispute between a customer and a member of FINRA that is
submitted to arbitration. 106

FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 90, DISP 2.3.1.
Id. DISP 2.6.1.
104
Terms
of
Reference,
FINANCIAL
OMBUDSMAN
SERVICE,
http://www.fos.org.au/centric/home_page/about_us/terms_of_reference_b.jsp (last visited May 6, 2012).
105
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, supra note 79.
106
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES FOR
CUSTOMER DISPUTES (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/
@arbrul/documents/arbmed/p117546.pdf.
103
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RECOMMENDATION 2―RANGE OF DISPUTES
The proposed jurisdiction of the FDRC should have a sectoral, rather
than institutional basis not only to avoid the issues of inconsistency,
confusion, and forum-shopping by eligible complainants, but to reflect the
underlying regulatory regime that applies to the services that are the subject
of the FDRC resolution. Hence, all MPF and insurance disputes should be
referred back to the relevant dispute resolution/complaint scheme, or
alternatively, uniform handling processes for such disputes must be
developed by the FDRC in conjunction with such schemes in order to ensure
that such disputes are dealt with in the same way.
The parallel complaints process should be streamlined so that
complainants need not go through complaint filing twice, as with the dual
oversight of listing documents by the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited and the SFC.
In developing the concept of a parallel complaints process, issues
arise as to how findings of fact in one part of the process will inform the
other. It may thus be preferable to abandon the use of the “monetary nature”
distinction in favor of a streamlined complaints process that, where
regulatory issues arise out of a complaint, the findings of any investigation
may be used in the dispute resolution process and any regulatory breaches
could give rise to a summary procedure for an award under the FDRC.
B.

Procedure

The proposed procedure that the FDRC will follow involves three
stages. First, there is a preliminary stage at which complaints will be
assessed for whether or not they fall within the jurisdiction of the FDRC.107
Second, where the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the FDRC, it
will be mediated.108 Finally, if mediation fails to resolve the dispute, the
dispute will be referred to an arbitrator. 109 Prima facie, the proposed
procedure resembles the procedures found in the four jurisdictions studied.

107
108
109

FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1.
Id.
Id. at 37-38.
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TABLE 3
SCHEME
FOS
(UK)

FOS
(Aus)

FIDReC

FINRA

1.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE
The approach of the FOS (UK) depends on the facts of the complaint, but
generally, the FOS (UK) will attempt to settle the complaint informally
through mediation or conciliation. If such conciliation or mediation is not
possible, based on the relevant documents, an adjudicator’s view on how
the case should be resolved is given in writing to both sides. Where one
side is unhappy with the adjudicator’s view, it can ask for a review and final
decision by an ombudsman.
The FOS (Aus) will review and consider the dispute, and try to resolve the
dispute through mutual agreement, including conciliation or negotiation
methods.110 Where mutual agreement is not possible, the FOS (Aus) will
conduct a detailed investigation and may offer initial views on the merits of
the dispute if it will assist the parties in reaching a resolution.111 The FOS
(Aus) will often issue a recommendation, and if it is not accepted by either
party, a determination can be made.112
There is a three-stage process in the settlement of disputes by the FIDReC.
First, the Counseling Service assists in a preliminary review of the case
based on facts and documents provided by the complainant. After the
preliminary review, the consumer is provided with a copy of FIDReC’s
dispute resolution form and allowed time to consider whether to proceed to
lodge a formal complaint against the financial institution in question.113 A
case manager will try to mediate a settlement between the consumer and
financial institution.
Where appropriate, mediation conferences are
arranged to allow parties to communicate face-to-face. 114 Disputes that
cannot be resolved by mediation and case management will proceed to the
third stage, where an adjudicator or panel of adjudicators with relevant
expertise will decide in favor of either the consumer or the financial
institution.115
FINRA Dispute Resolution (“FINRADR”) provides a non-binding
mediation program and arbitration services.

The Preliminary Stage

The preliminary stage of the FDRC dispute resolution process
involves an intake officer trained in mediation.116 Complainants make an
110

Dispute
Handling
Process
in
Detail,
FINANCIAL
OMBUDSMAN
SERVICE,
http://www.fos.org.au/centric/home_page/resolving_disputes/dispute_handling_process_in_detail.jsp (last
visited May 6, 2011).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DISPUTES RESOLUTION CENTRE LTD, ANNUAL REPORT 2009-2010 (2010).
114
ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 82.
115
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, supra note 79.
116
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1.

JUNE 2012 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESIGN IN FINANCIAL MARKETS

511

inquiry, and it is then up to the intake officer to address the enquiry and
decide whether or not the dispute raised by the complainant is within the
jurisdiction of the FDRC.117 Where that dispute falls within the jurisdiction
of the FDRC, the complainant shall complete a claim form, upon receipt
which the intake officer will conduct a fact-finding exercise and also invite a
response from the relevant financial institution.118 The intake officers at this
stage explore the settlement of the dispute before it enters the mediation
stage, and it is proposed that the intake officers have final and conclusive
discretion not to process a dispute where it appears frivolous or vexatious.119
In the Consultation Conclusions on the FDRC, it was clarified that the
qualification and training of the intake officers are of particular importance,
and the criteria for taking up cases should also be made clear.120
This proposed preliminary stage reflects the importance of the hotline
and the preparatory meetings in gathering information before the dispute
resolution process begins, which was one of the key lessons learned from the
Lehman Scheme. 121 It also bears some resemblance to the preliminary
review of the FIDReC, though the proposed exploration of an early
settlement does not appear to go as far as to highlight relevant clauses and
issues for the complainant. The experience in Singapore reflects a high
success rate with its case management process, introduced in 2007. For the
thirty-six months from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2010, FIDReC’s Counseling
Service amicably resolved 1,634 cases, resulting in savings of time and
resources. 122 This measure was designed to further enhance its dispute
resolution processes, and is especially suitable for resolving disputes which
are simpler in scope and issues by helping the consumer better understand
the dispute and relevant issues as well as aiding the consumer in considering
any settlement offer made by the financial institution in a more objective
light.
One of the challenges the Lehman Scheme had to overcome 123 —
which has also been mentioned above in respect to the Civil Justice
Reform—relates to the potential abuse of the dispute resolution process,
117

Id.
Id.
Id.
120
PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INVESTOR EDUCATION COUNCIL AND A FINANCIAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CENTRE: CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS [hereinafter CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS],
available at http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/consult/doc/consult_iec_fdrc_conslusion_e.pdf.
121
Gary Soo et al., Better Ways of Resolving Disputes in Hong Kong―Some Insights from the
Lehman-Brothers Related Investment Product Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme, 9 J. INT’L
BUS. & L. 137 (2010).
122
ANNUAL REPORT 2009-2010, supra note 113.
123
Id.
118
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particularly where parties or one party does not approach the dispute
resolution process with a real intent to resolve the dispute.
While abuses may have been prevented during the preparatory
meeting stage in the Lehman Scheme, the proposal to weed out complaints
that lack merit and other abuses that would be a drain on resources at this
early stage is not unusual. In common law jurisdictions, it is not unusual for
complaints falling outside the jurisdiction of a tribunal to be excluded
without a hearing, but in the United Kingdom, it is the Ombudsman who is
empowered to dismiss a complaint without a hearing on its merits for a
number of well-defined reasons.124 Similarly, it is therefore imperative that
the FDRC intake officers be trained not only with mediation knowledge but
also knowledge about the financial industry, and either be subject to review
or reviewed following an application by the relevant financial institution on
clearly established grounds. The prospect of dismissal without hearing or
review at such an early stage is an area for potential abuse and therefore
safeguards and oversight will be necessary.
Given the limits on available resources, a balance must be struck
between access to justice and preventing abuses of process. However, it is
unusual, in comparison with other jurisdictions, for complaints to be weeded
out at such an early stage, and indeed this may not be appropriate given the
lack of evidence at this stage. The task of the intake officer to explore
settlement and his power to exercise final discretion over vexatious or
frivolous claims may be interpreted as improper pressure on complainants to
settle. In this regard, the concept of an abuse of process in civil court
procedure and the definitions of vexatious and frivolous complaints might be
considered for their potential applicability to the preliminary stage, and the
processes by which unmeritorious claims are dealt with in other jurisdictions
could also be applied to the FDRC process.

124

FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 90, DISP 3.3.4.
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RECOMMENDATION 3―THE PRELIMINARY STAGE
In light of the high rate of success in Singapore, consideration may be
given towards modifying the FDRC proposal in respect to the preliminary
stage to more closely resemble the FIDReC’s preliminary review. The
establishment of the issues between the parties early on would help to make
the entire dispute resolution process more efficient, and indeed, such reviews
may help a high number of cases reach an early settlement without even
resorting to the other stages of the FDRC dispute resolution process.
It would be preferable, however, for intake officers not to be
responsible or empowered with final discretion in respect to frivolous or
vexatious complaints. This would not be in line with the practices of other
jurisdictions nor even the judicial system of Hong Kong, where processes
against frivolous or vexatious complainants are usually initiated by the
respondent rather than the arbiter―the inappropriateness for the arbiter to be
both initiator and judge of such a process is clear. A process separate from
the exclusion of ineligible complaints or complainants to handle frivolous
and vexatious complaints should be adopted.
2.

Mediation

All leading jurisdictions have come to rely primarily on mediation as
the preferred process for the resolution of disputes, given mediation’s speed
and simplicity. All four jurisdictions studied show that the vast majority of
cases are concluded at the mediation stage. The criticisms that have been
leveled against alternative dispute resolution processes, such as the lack of
an independent and impartial third party during negotiations, and the
capacity for such processes to mask inbuilt power inequalities between the
parties,125 are genuine concerns that must be examined alongside questions
of efficiency.126
In its Consultation Conclusions, the FSTB emphasized the need for
quality and qualified mediators and arbitrators, including those with the
necessary knowledge to deal with financial disputes 127 presumably in
response to these concerns raised during the consultation.

125
THE HON. MCCLELLAN, CIVIL JUSTICE IN AUSTRALIA―CHANGES IN THE TRIAL PROCESS, CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM―WHAT HAS IT ACHIEVED? 65 (2010).
126
Lauren Edelman, Howard Erlanger, & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 497-534 (1993).
127
See, e.g., Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 29 (2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=229990.
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Forms of Mediation

The use of mediation in the FDRC process raises the issue of what
form that mediation will take. Generally speaking, among the numerous
forms of mediation, there are two modes relevant to the resolution of
financial disputes: facilitative, which is interest-based, and evaluative or
rights-based.
In interest-based mediation, the mediator assists or facilitates
communications between the parties and negotiations generally. The role of
the mediator is to help the parties reach a settlement via exploration of the
parties underlying interests and needs.128 This is the form of mediation now
most commonly deployed in Hong Kong through the Civil Justice
Reform.129
On the other hand, evaluative mediation involves a mediator making
an assessment of and expressing a view on the merits of the dispute, albeit a
non-binding view. 130 This form of mediation is more common to the
Ombudsman process in other jurisdictions, and is closer to the command
model of dispute resolution (where a third party is empowered to suggest a
resolution of the dispute) than a consensual model (where the power to
resolve the dispute rests with the parties).
What form of mediation is to be deployed by the FDRC goes to the
heart of the issues that this study raises: what type of dispute resolution
methods are most appropriate for use in the context of financial regulation,
and how do the aims of financial regulation inform the choice of method?
b.

Criticisms of the Mediation Process

Despite the success mediation has enjoyed in terms of high rates of
settlement, particularly in other jurisdictions, it is a form of alternative
dispute resolution that is not without its critics. The risk of mediation, being
an unregulated form of “informal justice”―enjoying a quasi-regulatory
authority without the safeguards that are built into litigation―is that it can
mask power imbalances in the relationship between parties.131 This in turn
could lead to consumer dissatisfaction. Such critics may also point to the
128

Id.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE HKSAR, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON MEDIATION
(2010), available at http://www.gov.hk/en/residents/government/publication/consultation/docs/2010/Media
tion.pdf.
130
See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGO. L. REV. 7 (1997)
131
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
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heavier cost consequences in the event that alternative dispute resolution
processes break down and necessitate court intervention.132
Locally, despite its wider use and integration into the civil litigation
process, mediation has been abused by insincere litigants and legal
professionals,133 which may be attributable to the lack of local experience
with mediation and the relatively high degree of public trust in the
independence and expertise of the judicial system.
c.

Appropriateness of Mediation in Financial Dispute Resolution

One key issue in the facilitative model of mediation is that the
solution is negotiated, but not required to be principled. This arguably limits
the role that the substantive law plays in the settlement of a dispute―as the
positive law’s norm enforcement is subordinated to the dispute resolution
process. In the context of financial markets, this may not be desirable for
consumers, whose complaints or grievances are likely to arise from a sense
of wrongdoing on the part of financial service providers, and thus parties
may have expectations about the protection of the consumers’ rights and
principled settlements to reflect those rights. For example, as described
above, the key issue for Minibonds disputes was whether or not the risks
were fully disclosed and communicated. In mediating or arbitrating their
claims, complainants were quite simply not in a position to understand and
unravel the complex structure of these instruments in order to quantify the
risk they potentially represented, and thus know the true value of their own
claims.134 This placed Minibond complainants at an enormous disadvantage
when trying to resolve their disputes with the relevant financial institutions,
in not being fully aware of what their rights against the financial institutions
were.135 Overcoming this issue requires the integration of legal norms to
enhance transparency and consistency of settlements. The use of an
evaluation of merits such as in evaluative mediation may potentially lend
itself towards a more satisfactory experience for consumers than interestbased mediation.
The power imbalance to be addressed in the financial industry
between the consumer and financial service provider is based on the
132

MCCLELLAN, supra note 125.
Patsy Moy, Mediation Isn’t Being Taken Seriously, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 29, 2011,
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assumption that the financial institution is in the best position of knowledge
in respect to products, services, and risks―arguably even better than
regulators. Therefore, safeguards such as regulatory and legal guidelines
and external oversight may be required to effectively address such
imbalances.
In the specific context of Hong Kong, its historical
development as a laissez-faire economy is based on norms of efficiency and
effective competition, which in turn is driven by the free flow of information.
Much of the regulatory framework in Hong Kong’s financial markets is built
on a notion of a level playing field in terms of the knowledge of all the
participants, rather than the protection of consumers. An example of the
regulatory framework redressing knowledge imbalance is the regime against
insider dealing in Hong Kong, which gives extensive powers of investigation
to regulators―in particular, the power to curtail the right of silence. 136
Evaluative mediation, in some cases, may thus be more appropriate in the
setting of Hong Kong’s financial regulation system to address imbalances of
power and knowledge between financial service provider and consumer.
RECOMMENDATION 4―MEDIATION
In developing the mediation stage of the FDRC’s proposed procedure,
serious consideration may be given to the adoption of evaluative mediation
in certain cases, in line with the practices of Ombudsmen in other
jurisdictions. The relevant power imbalance that the proposed FDRC will
primarily be called upon to address is that of the state of knowledge between
the financial service provider and the consumer. An approach to dispute
resolution that integrates regulatory standards or uses them as touchstones,
such as evaluative mediation, thus appears to be more consistent with aims
of financial oversight in Hong Kong, which is largely disclosure-based.
3.

Arbitration

Much attention has been focused on the decision that the FDRC use
an arbitral rather than an ombudsman model. One key issue in respect to
appropriateness is following the failure of the mediation process, what is the
reason the parties have failed to reach a settlement? Where there are
inconsistent interpretations of the facts or rules, the role of an intervening
third party is interpretive, thereby requiring an adjudicator. Where
mediation is unsuccessful, complainants may proceed to arbitrate their
claims. Arbitration will generally take the form of a documents-only
136
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arbitration, before a single arbitrator, unless the issues are too complex, in
which case the arbitrator will determine whether or not a hearing is
necessary. Among the benefits of arbitration is its final binding nature.137 In
the Consultation Conclusions, the FSTB argued that the use of a two-tiered
dispute resolution process is in line with overseas experience, and there is
functionally little difference between an arbitrator and an ombudsman, other
than that an arbitrator enjoys greater power. 138 The FSTB particularly
highlighted the fact that Hong Kong has a strong and large pool of
arbitrators.139 However, some potential challenges with the use of an arbitral
model also exist given the unique circumstances of Hong Kong.
a.

Submissions by the Law Society

In adopting an arbitration process over setting up an ombudsman, the
Consultation Conclusions made particular reference to the submissions of
the Hong Kong Law Society, which expressed “serious reservations” about
the establishment of an ombudsman for the purposes of dispute resolution
for financial service providers.140 The Law Society submissions suggested
that the negotiation-mediation-arbitration formula proposed for the FDRC
would be preferable to ombudsman or ombudsman-like set-ups in other
jurisdictions.141
b.

The Circumstances of Hong Kong

The lack of familiarity of the public with alternative dispute resolution
processes should raise concerns about public understanding and
expectations―the multi-tiered approach of the FDRC resembles the
hierarchy of the Hong Kong court system, but the arbitral process under the
proposed FDRC procedure is of course not intended to be a review of the
mediation process. It should be noted that in the United States, mediation is
not mandatory, and undergoing mediation is not a prerequisite to securities
arbitration. The absence of review between the mediation and arbitration
processes in the proposed FDRC should be contrasted with the multi-tiered
structure used by the ombudsmen in other common law jurisdictions, and in
particular, the notion of an internal right of review as mentioned above,

137
138
139
140
141

FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 41.
See CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS, supra note 120.
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which more closely resembles the court processes to which the public of
Hong Kong is accustomed.
It should also be borne in mind that at present, the pool of arbitrators
with sufficient experience in both arbitration and financial regulation
appears to be limited―the HKIAC issued a notice to the Bar offering
training for the purposes of the Scheme (emphasizing prior mediation
experience in particular),142 illustrating the need for growth in the existing
pool of mediators and arbitrators in this area.
In the context of financial regulation in Hong Kong, questions as to
the appropriateness of arbitration must be raised in light of the experience in
the United States in contrast with that of the FOS (UK). In this regard,
appearance and perception of consumers appears to play as important a role
as actual function.

142
HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION, CIRCULAR NO. 118/08 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at
http://hkbademo.zmallplanet.com/members/circulars/2008/2008118.pdf.
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RECOMMENDATION 5―ARBITRATION
The arbitral process proposed under the FDRC already avoids one of
the major issues that have made the United States’ securities arbitration
controversial, in that the arbitral process is non-mandatory.
The advantages offered by the ombudsman model do not necessarily
mean that an ombudsman model need be adopted by the FDRC wholesale;
rather, the FDRC arbitral process may be customized to resemble the
ombudsman model or to offer its benefits, for example, by using an informal
process. Rather than adopting a papers-only arbitration, which offers
efficiency but may raise issues about transparency, particularly in the
decision-making process, a procedure resembling the Small Claims Tribunal
should be considered. Complainants should still be offered a papers-only
arbitration if they prefer, with costs scaled appropriately, but complainants
should not be denied the opportunity to air their grievances in person and to
scrutinize the decision-making process―particularly as it appears from the
experience in the United Kingdom that a more personal approach is more
successful in addressing consumer expectations and attitudes.
Although proponents of arbitration in the FDRC argue that finality
may be one of the key advantages offered over the ombudsman model,
serious consideration should be given to increasing the scrutiny of the courts
over the FDRC arbitral process, possibly through the adoption of the
relevant opt-in clauses under the new Arbitration Ordinance. While in the
short term, this may lead to increased costs, the courts’ expanded powers to
penalize litigants whose cases are frivolous under the Civil Justice Reform
should be borne in mind. The long-term advantage is the strengthening of
the authoritativeness of the FDRC through its interaction and confirmation
by the courts.
4.

Litigation

One issue that is not detailed in the proposal is how the FDRC
processes will interact with or inform litigation, for example, where a
complainant engages in the FDRC mediation process and subsequently opts
to air remaining dissatisfaction in the courts rather than by way of arbitration.
Of particular relevance is how information that has been exchanged by the
parties in the course of the preliminary stage or the mediation stage (or
indeed even the arbitration stage) is to be dealt with before the courts.
The mediation process under the Civil Justice Reform is a confidential
process―effectively characterized as “without prejudice” negotiations.
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However, as has been noted above, there exists between consumers and
financial service providers a potential information gap, which the FDRC
may be required to bridge to enhance the fairness between parties. It
therefore may not be a simple matter of applying the same confidentiality to
FDRC processes, as the information that emerges may well be key to
attaining justice for either side before the courts.
RECOMMENDATION 6―LITIGATION
Where a complainant seeks to bring a case from the FDRC to the
courts, the FDRC should play a role similar to that of the scheme―to
attempt to narrow down the facts and issues between the parties. This would
make the litigation process more efficient and overcome any issues relating
to disclosed information by agreement between the parties as to the facts
prior to litigation.
5.

Awards

The maximum award that is proposed to be made under the
jurisdiction of the FDRC is HK$500,000.143 This is said to cover “over 80%
of the monetary disputes handled by the HKMA and about 80% of stock
investors.”144
TABLE 4
SCHEME
FOS
(UK)
FOS
(Aus)

FIDReC

FINRA

143
144
145
146
147
148
149

LIMITS OF AWARDS
The maximum money award the Ombudsman may make is £100,000 145
(approx. HK$1,270,000), from which costs, interest on the principal award
and interest on costs are excluded.146
As of January 1, 2012, the ASIC will require compensation caps from
external dispute resolution schemes of at least AU$280,000 (approx.
HK$2,296,000), except in the case of general insurance brokers, where the
compensation cap is at least AU$150,000.147
The maximum monetary awards for compensation are US$100,000 for
claims against insurance companies, and US$50,000 (approx. HK$310,000)
for all other disputes.148
No statutory cap is imposed on the value of awards,149 and awards are final
and binding, even if new evidence surfaces later.150

FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 42.
Id.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 90, DISP 3.7.4.
Id., DISP 3.7.5.
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, supra note 92.
ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 82.
Alpert, supra note 94.
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The monetary award limit is considerably lower than that of the UK or
Australia, but higher than that of Singapore. The FSTB clarified in its
Consultation Conclusions that the cap applies to individual claims, and thus
complainants could bring claims that add up to more than $500,000 where
there is more than one dispute.151 It was also clarified that claims for over
$500,000 could be brought, but the maximum award would remain at
$500,000.152 This cap will be reviewed from time to time.153
While the reasoning behind the limit on awards appears sound, it is
unclear whether or not the complaints handled by the HKMA concerning
monetary disputes mentioned in the Consultation Document include the
large numbers of Minibond claims, and if such a figure takes into account
claims that are taken to court by eligible complainants rather than to the
HKMA. It should be noted that the civil jurisdiction of the district court is
currently for claims under $1,000,000, and thus consumers may have chosen
to pursue their private rights at the district court rather than to bring the
matter to the HKMA given the HKMA’s lack of jurisdiction in respect to
consumer compensation.
RECOMMENDATION 7―AWARDS
Serious consideration should be given to raising the limit of the
FDRC’s jurisdiction to HK$1 million in order to bring it in line with other
jurisdictions. Provision should also be made for the jurisdiction of the
FDRC to track the jurisdiction of the district court so that when the district
court increases its jurisdiction, the FDRC should follow suit. This would
also serve to ensure that the courts need not be overly burdened by smaller
securities claims and at the same time, would enable a greater number of
consumers to make use of the FDRC rather than be forced to engage in
costly litigation merely because their claims are of a sum higher than
HK$500,000.

150
Overview of Arbitration & Mediation, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/OverviewofArbitrationMediation.
151
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1.
152
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Costs

It is proposed that the FDRC will charge both consumers and financial
institutions on a “pay as you use” basis for its services. 154 Under the
Consultation Conclusions, the fee structure was set out as follows:
TABLE 5
FEE TYPE

CLAIMANT

Making enquiries
Filing a claim form
Mediation
Amount of claims:
- less than HK$100,000
- between HK$100,000-$500,000
Arbitration (regardless of amount of
claims)

Nil
HK$200
(Case fees)

FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION
Not applicable
Not applicable
(Case fees)

HK$1,000
HK$2,000
(Case fees)
HK$5,000

HK$5,000
HK$10,000
(Case fees)
HK$20,000

1.

Comparing the Charges of Ombudsmen and the SROs

The proposed costs of the FDRC may be contrasted with the
ombudsmen in common law jurisdictions, which offer their services free of
charge, or charge a nominal case fee for adjudication under Singapore’s
FIDReC.

154

Id. at 42.
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TABLE 6
SCHEME
FOS
(UK)

FOS
(Aus)
FIDReC

FINRA

2.

COSTS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES
Consumers do not pay to bring complaints to the FOS.155 Businesses do not
pay case fees in respect to the first three complaints settled during a year,
but there is a fee of £500 for the fourth and each subsequent complaint.156
The FSA Handbook expressly sets out that complainants do not need to
have professional advisers to bring complaints, and thus awards of costs
should be uncommon.157
Per the requirements of ASIC, external dispute resolution schemes provide
their services free of charge to consumers.158
No fees are charged to consumers where the dispute is resolved by case
management or mediation.159 A US$50 fee is charged to consumers where
the dispute is escalated to the adjudication stage to deter frivolous
complaints, but is kept low in order to ensure FIDReC is affordable for
consumers.160
As of April 14, 2011, the arbitration filing fee for a customer of a member
firm of FINRA for an undisclosed amount and/or other relief (determined
by a panel of three arbitrators per Rule 13900(b)) is US$1,250 (approx.
HK$9,750) and the estimated hearing fees for one day of hearing is
US$3,000 (approx. HK$23,400).161

Purposes of Charging

In the consultation process, it was stated that the fee structure was
intended to be affordable for complainants but at the same time be set at
levels that would provide an incentive to resolve disputes at an early
stage. 162 The amounts also take into consideration the market rates for
mediators in Hong Kong at present.163
Due to the express mandate of the regulators of the United Kingdom
and Australia in respect to consumer protection, ombudsmen services are
free of charge.
155
The
Case
Fee,
FINANCIAL
OMBUDMAN
SERVICE,
http://www.financialombudsman.org.uk/faq/answers/research_a5.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
156
Id.
157
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 90, DISP 3.710.
158
How to Complain About Companies or People, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND
INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Complaining+about+compani
es+or+people?openDocument (last visited May 6, 2012).
159
ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, supra note 82.
160
Id.
161
Calculated using the “Arbitration Filing Fee Calculator.” See Arbitration Filing Fee Calculator,
FINRA, http://apps.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/ArbFeeCalc/1/Default.aspx (last visited May 1, 2012).
162
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 37-38.
163
Id. at 43.
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A considerably lower nominal amount is charged to consumers in
Singapore when the dispute is escalated to the adjudication stage―the fee is
imposed to deter frivolous complaints, but is minimized in order to ensure
FIDReC is affordable for consumers.
In respect to the considerably higher costs of FINRA arbitration, one
commentator has pointed out that unlike in the case of the United Kingdom
or Australia, since FINRA complainants must pay an arbitration fee, a
hearing deposit, and attorneys’ fees, cost-deterrence serves as a filter, and
therefore strict jurisdictional prerequisites for arbitration are unnecessary.164
It is thus clear that one of the purposes of charging costs of dispute
resolution to consumers is to filter out frivolous complaints, as well as to
encourage settlement of disputes at an early stage, thus preventing draining
limited resources. However, as is noted above, jurisdictional prerequisites
also serve similar purposes in respect to allocation of resources.
In comparison with the costs of litigation, the proposed costs of the
FDRC are still relatively low, but whether or not these costs could serve as
an obstacle to access to justice may depend on associated costs.
3.

Associated Costs

One key issue that was addressed in the recommendations of the SFC
is that of legal representation, and whether or not parties will be entitled to
have legal representatives, particularly at the arbitration stage. In the case of
the ombudsmen in common law jurisdictions, legal representation is not
allowed, in line with the suggestion of the SFC that legal representation
should be discouraged for the purposes of a financial dispute resolution
scheme in Hong Kong. In the United States, the involvement of legal
representatives has increased both the cost and complexity of securities
regulation. This is a significant issue for the FSTB to address, as it has the
potential to either drive up costs and formality (where legal representation is
allowed) or to create an impression of inequality between the parties,
particularly as to their experience with disputes and presenting their cases
(where legal representation is not allowed).

164

Alpert, supra note 94.
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RECOMMENDATION 8―COSTS
It is suggested that costs should be scaled for persons falling under the
“professional investor” definition, particularly high net worth individuals, to
ensure the subsidies of the FDRC to dispute resolution processes are
allocated according to need.
It is also suggested that costs should be brought in line with the costs
of other schemes such as the one for insurance products in order to enhance
consistency and discourage forum shopping by consumers.
IV.

ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL AGAINST THE MINIBONDS CRISIS

In view of the Minibonds Crisis as providing the impetus for the
creation of the FDRC, it is a pertinent and useful exercise to examine the
dispute resolution process of the FDRC in a hypothetical application to the
Minibonds Crisis in order to further explore certain regulatory issues in a
practical context.
One may presume that with Hong Kong’s financial markets
characterized by a high number of individual retail investors and Minibonds
framed as over-the-counter retail investment product, a high number of
Minibond complainants would have been eligible complainants. One may
also presume that a high proportion of those eligible complainants would
have claims within the award limit of the FDRC given the reasoning by
which the award limit was established. Thus, had the FDRC existed at the
time of the Minibonds Crisis, it could be presumed that the FDRC would
have received a high number of Minibond complaints.
While the Minibonds Crisis in and of itself may be characterized as
highly out of the ordinary, the issues it raises in the context of the FDRC
may not be.
A.

Consistency and Playing for the Rules

One aspect of the FDRC process that could potentially lead to
complainants being at a disadvantage is the fact that as time progresses,
financial institutions may build up experience in respect to claims amounts
and settlements as repeat players. By contrast, consumers, as one-time users,
may be left in the dark as to the true value of their complaint. Under the
facilitative model of mediation, as mediators only facilitate discussions and
are not supposed to give advice, the experience of the mediators in this
regard does not assist complainants.
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While it is proposed that the FDRC will publish data about
disputes,165 the confidential nature of the settlements appears to mean that
there will be no guidance for consumers or even arbitrators as to settlement
amounts and awards for cases that involve similar facts or issues. This not
only gives rise to a potential issue of uneven rates of settlement but also
means that each dispute is destined to go through the same time-consuming
process rather than to increase efficiency in reaching settlement of common
or similar complaints.
One study in the United Kingdom demonstrated the effectiveness of
the ombudsman model in neutralizing the advantage of financial service
providers due to the lack of formality and evaluative nature of decisionmaking. Such characteristics could well be adopted by the FDRC, and in
order to ensure consistency, the FDRC should arrange for frequent meetings
of its staff, mediators, and arbitrators to discuss their experiences with
claims and how they handled them.
B.

Systemic Issues and Parallel Jurisdiction

As set out in the consultation document, the role of the FDRC is not
intended to be regulatory. It thus does not engage in any investigation and
would only deal with the monetary aspects of cases that could also include
regulatory violations. 166 Furthermore, where the FDRC handles cases
involving systemic and widespread regulatory violations, the FDRC will
turn these cases over to the regulators to deal with and cease to handle
them.167
Thus, even though Minibond claimants may have been eligible
complainants and within the award limit of the FDRC, they may potentially
have been barred from bringing the regulatory aspects of the complaints to
the FDRC.
Thus far, no review of the Minibonds Crisis has characterized it as
systemic, but whether or not its widespread nature may have led it to be
considered systemic at least for the purposes of early warning or until more
facts about the Minibonds emerged raises questions about what actions
would be appropriate in the face of a systemic concern, and what effect
systemic issues will have on the private rights of complainants in the FDRC
context.

165
166
167

FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TREASURY BUREAU, supra note 1, at 46.
Id. at 46-48.
Id. at 48.
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ASSESSING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS
FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION

Whether or not the FDRC can avoid the perception of a de facto
protector of consumer rights in the financial markets of Hong Kong remains
to be seen. Other than its place in the regulatory structure, an equally
important assessment is the appropriateness of alternative dispute resolution
techniques for financial dispute resolution. In the course of this article,
several ideas have emerged for the enhancement of the FDRC proposal with
respect to the experience of similar schemes in other jurisdictions. This
suggests that some methods of dispute resolution may be preferred over
others due to the needs of disputes between consumers and financial service
providers. One example of such a need is the need to bridge the
power/knowledge gap between consumers and financial service providers.
Different jurisdictions offer different answers to the question of
whether or not financial dispute resolution schemes necessarily play
regulatory roles. Alternative dispute resolution schemes are usually set up
with efficiency in mind―in the particular context of financial markets,
enhancing market efficiency by reducing the resources devoted to dispute
resolution. Such schemes are supplemental to, rather than substitutive of the
court system, and lack a judicial mandate. The non-binding nature of the
ombudsmen and adjudicator’s decisions (except where accepted by the
complainant) is perhaps the clearest indicator that there is no intent to
completely displace the judicial function. By contrast, the FINRA
arbitration scheme is accepted as part of the regulatory mechanism in the
United States, and its mandatory nature and unrestricted jurisdiction appear
to imply a mandate to displace the court function in certain aspects of
financial regulation.
In navigating the potential areas of overlap between the regulatory and
non-regulatory functions of financial dispute resolution service providers,
the parallel complaints procedure must be clearly established between the
dispute resolution service and the regulators, and in matters of fact-finding,
the lead must be taken by the regulators.168 For jurisdictions that do not
have a specific consumer protection mandate, such as in Hong Kong, it
should be borne in mind that in the aftermath of the Minibonds Crisis, there
may be an expectation on the part of the public that a dispute resolution
body be set up for the purposes of filling in the consumer protection gap and
resolving disputes in the absence of such a regulatory mandate.
168

Id. at 46.
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In considering what forms of alternative dispute resolution are
suitable for addressing disputes between consumers and financial service
providers, the need for the third party intervener in any mode of dispute
resolution to address the power/knowledge gap is clear. The need to address
the gap may, particularly at the early stages of dispute resolution, lend itself
towards the command end of the dispute resolution spectrum and the
integration of relevant standards and rules, at least as touchstones, to inform
an equitable negotiation process. It may suggest the need for external
experts, information centers, and resources to be made available to
unrepresented parties. The integration of such norms, however, does not
necessarily lend itself to a regulatory role.
Even in the absence of, or separate from a consumer protection
mandate, the principles of equity, fairness and transparency operate to bridge
the power/knowledge gap between consumers and financial service
providers in order to achieve equity in the dispute resolution process. This
may arguably be considered a reflection of the regulatory philosophy of
disclosure that dominates financial regulation.
The premise that inquisitorial, semi-evaluative models of dispute
resolution are better suited where the intent is a regulatory role, and
consensual models are to be preferred in the context of non-regulatory
dispute resolution schemes, must therefore be supplemented by an
underlying notion of what is necessary to achieve equity and fairness
between the two disputing parties in determining appropriateness. Hence, to
a certain extent, command elements may be necessary for the resolution of
financial disputes even where consensual models are being used.
VI.

CONCLUSION: ENHANCING THE FDRC

The consultation documents on the FDRC refer to four main
principles on which the FDRC is based: independence, impartiality,
accessibility, and efficiency.169 Further reference is made to principles such
as affordability, speediness, cost effectiveness, and confidentiality—all of
which are important principles in the implementation of financial dispute
resolution programs.170
Specific suggestions have been made in this paper to different aspects
of the FDRC process in light of experience in other jurisdictions. These
include 1) improving accessibility via the expansion of eligible complainants,
while at the same time enhancing cost effectiveness by restricting the
169
170

Id. at 35.
Id. at 29.
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subsidized access of professional investors or scaling the charges of the
FDRC for different types of users, 2) reducing the reliance upon the
monetary nature distinction, instead of streamlining and emphasizing the
parallel procedure of processing complaints by regulators and the FDRC,
and avoiding inconsistency and confusion by clearly carving out disputes
relating to MPF and insurance products from the jurisdiction of the FDRC or
creating uniform handling processes for such disputes, 3) where the FDRC
process fails to resolve the dispute, attempts should be made at the FDRC
stage to narrow down the factual disputes and issues between the parties in
order to enhance the efficiency of litigation, 4) the limit on awards the
FDRC can make should be increased to reflect the jurisdiction of the district
court and further enhance accessibility, and 5) costs should not only be
scaled, but associated costs of the FDRC process should be reduced by
barring legal representation from the FDRC, thus improving the cost
effectiveness of the process overall.
While it is clear that some of the ideas and suggestions enhance the
proposed FDRC in accordance with the principles on which it is based, (e.g.,
expanding eligible complainants increases accessibility), many of the ideas
and suggestions emerge from the comparison of the proposal to the
experience with financial dispute resolution schemes of other jurisdictions.
In the context of the foregoing discussion on distinguishing between
regulatory and non-regulatory schemes of dispute resolution, many of the
suggestions can be explained by their emphasis on the non-regulatory role of
the FDRC. Specifically, the adoption of a parallel complaints-handling
procedure led by the financial regulators emphasizes the fact that the FDRC
has no investigative powers of its own, while the suggestion that the FDRC
arbitral awards should not be binding unless the complainant so chooses
means that the FDRC process does not exercise a judicial function or
displaces the courts, which is arguably the strongest indicator of a regulatory
role.
The appropriateness of the form of dispute resolution for a nonregulatory scheme also implies that many of the suggestions are concerned
with the reduction of the command elements in the FDRC process, or with
moving them down the spectrum away from the command end. The idea of
non-binding arbitral awards is one way in which the FDRC process can be
made more consensual, while the exclusion of legal representation not only
lowers costs but also has the potential to decrease formality.
However, the principles that bind the majority of the suggestions
together are those of equity and fairness. Restricting professional investors’
subsidized access to the FDRC not only improves cost effectiveness but also
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enhances the distribution of the FDRC’s resources to where the need for
them may be greater. The parallel complaints-handling mechanism and
suggestion of reference to regulatory and legal touchstones operates to
ensure that the knowledge gap between consumers and financial service
providers will be bridged. The adoption of a separate process for dealing
with frivolous or vexatious complaints should ensure that complainants are
not barred from the FDRC process on a mere prima facie basis―but at the
same time, such a process should also help to protect against frivolous and
vexatious claims.
The appropriateness of the evaluative model of mediation has been
discussed already: the need to bridge the knowledge gap for consumers
speaks to a principle of equity and fairness by ensuring a level playing field
in terms of information―particularly about the true value of claims, as the
Minibonds Crisis served to demonstrate.
The changes suggested in respect to the arbitration stage of the FDRC
process serve not only to enhance the fairness of the process but also the
appearance of fairness―justice not only being done but also seen to be done.
Allowing hearings where complainants desire them and increasing the
oversight of the courts over the FDRC process subjects the FDRC to greater
scrutiny and the safeguards of the court system, which in turn should serve
to build confidence in the FDRC.
By charging the FDRC with a further duty to narrow down factual
disputes and issues between the parties even if the complaint cannot be
resolved should assist in dealing with how information that has been
disclosed during the FDRC process is to be treated in the course of litigation.
This should enhance the efficiency of litigation, but also offers a degree of
protection to parties where, for example, in the course of the FDRC process
it comes to light that there may be some contributory negligence on either
side―encouraging parties to agree how disclosed information is to be dealt
with prevents the abuse of positions of information that are established under
the FDRC.
The study of financial dispute resolution schemes in different
jurisdictions has, in this paper, led to tentative conclusions that the
appropriateness of the dispute resolution method is arguably informed by a
regulatory or non-regulatory role―dispute resolution modes closer to the
command model must incorporate safeguards for the disputants against the
discretion of the third party intervener. But even for non-regulatory schemes,
command elements such as the provision of legal and regulatory standards to
complainants may still be incorporated into consensual models of dispute
resolution, which speaks to a de minimis level of equity and fairness that
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must be achieved. The establishment and future effectiveness of the FDRC
will undoubtedly be measured against a number of important principles, as
espoused in the Consultation document, and not least of which include
fairness and equity. Just as the deceived investor will not invest,
complainants with no confidence in a financial dispute resolution scheme
will not make use of it, serving only to drive up the resources needed to
resolve financial disputes. Even absent a consumer protection mandate, the
need for a financial dispute resolution scheme to be designed according to
principles of fairness and equity not only reflects broader aims of a financial
regulation system, but on a practical level, furthers the aim of such schemes
to increase market efficiency, stability, and ideally to prevent the
exploitation of consumer investors.

